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This paper presents a capability-augmented model of on the job search, in which sweatshop 
conditions stifle the capability of the working poor to search for a job while on the job. The 
augmented setting unveils a sweatshop equilibrium in an otherwise archetypal Burdett-
Mortensen economy, and reconciles a number of oft noted yet perplexing features of 
sweatshop economies. We demonstrate existence of multiple rational expectation equilibria, 
graduation pathways out of sweatshops in complete absence of enforcement, and country-
specific efficiency and distributional responses to competitive forces and social safety nets 
depending precisely on whether graduation criteria are met. 
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 \The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the hon-
ourableness or dishonourableness of the employment". (Smith 1776, Ch. X Pt. 1.)
\The [sweat]shops of Ciudad Hidalgo were not, however, ecient; they were having real
trouble competing in the international marketplace; and the blatant violation of international
standards was not helping matters, indeed quite the contrary ... One had to conclude that if
the changes had been imposed by international labor standards, however imperialistic, they
would have contributed to eciency." (Piore 2004)
1 Introduction
Excessive overtime, wholesale disregard of safety and health conditions, low wages and lack of
rights and representation make up an ensemble of workplace conditions that have come to be
referred to as sweatshops (USGAO 1988). With roots going back to conditions of work in ten-
ement houses in the U.S. and in England at the turn of the 19th century, sweatshop conditions
have continued unabated aecting the poorest workers particularly in developing countries. The
impetus of the current debate is furthermore strengthened by a concern for both the quality and
quantity dimensions of work in the face of rising globalization (Engerman 2004), culminating in
calls to achieve Decent Work for All in a recent inuential ILO report (The Commission on the
Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004). The expressed goal is to safeguard a set of enabling
conditions in the workplace, to be achieved by abandoning the set of labor practices subsumed
under the term sweatshop jobs (Bourguignon 2005).
As an institution, a sweatshop job is rst and foremost an employment contract, not vi-
able of course unless there is worker participation. Powell and Skarbek (2006) provide stylized
proles of sweatshop and decent work earnings by comparing protested hourly sweatshop wages
as reported in the media { oft cited as evidence of worker exploitation and unfair trade { with
decent work wages, and per capita incomes. In almost all cases, decent work wages outstrip
sweatshop wages, while sweatshop earnings at 70 hours a week in turn far exceed per capita gross
national income. Such a ranking of job-specic workers' compensation stands at the heart of the
sweatshop debate, for it suggests (i) workers' incentives consistent with voluntary transition from
unemployment to sweatshop jobs or decent work, but simultaneously (ii) an outright absence of
a compensating dierential (Smith 1776, Rosen 1986) that should reect the ease or hardship of
sweatshop work if employment is indeed voluntary. It is thus little wonder that anti-sweatshop
1legislations are controversial: Does a ban on sweatshops simply deter welfare improving transi-
tions out of unemployment,1 or does it steer workers incentives clear of accepting low wages in
exchange for sweatshop conditions, or a combination of both?
A sweatshop also embodies a production function, relevant only when there is employer
participation. At the level of the rm, whether sweatshops are more ecient relative to decent
work is not at all self-evident, for while sweatshop conditions combine long hours with savings
on inputs required to raise safety and health standards, these are accomplished at the possible
risk of diminishing worker productivity (Piore 2004, Singh 2003). In the aggregate, evidence
on whether greater exports volumes are systematically associated with lower labor standards
is likewise mixed (Rodrik 1996, Brown 2000). However, if sweatshops are not selected out in
equilibrium in a market otherwise unfettered by regulations or other market imperfections, a
prima facie case is often made that blanket restriction on the choice of sweatshop technique
simply means less work and less exports overall, rather than a shift favoring more decent work
(Robinson 1964, Bardhan 2004). Indeed, reservations about labor standards legislations in general
are likewise often couched in terms of their eciency tradeos, wherein the sharing of the fruits
of production beyond the level that the market dictates can come at a cost through the quantity
of employment (Bardhan 2005: ch.12, Singh 2003).
The controversy over sweatshops is distinctive in this context precisely because it departs
from a singular focus on the quantity of employment, and draws attention instead to a hitherto
sparsely studied aspect of labor markets { the capability set of the employed (Sen 1993).2 In
reconciling the unemployment, eciency and distributional implications of sweatshop jobs, this
paper argues that important mileage and new insights can be gained by eshing out the conse-
quences of the capability dimension of work. In the broader context of labor market problems
that juxtapose the quality and quantity dimensions of employment, we identify key gaps in infer-
ences that can be drawn from archetypal labor market models when the conditions and capability
1The oft mentioned quotation from Robinson (1964) { \The only thing worse than being exploited by a capitalist
is not being exploited by a capitalist" { reects precisely this view. Likewise, in reference to sweatshop employment
in development countries, Bardhan (2005) articulates a similar view { \the poor are often banging at the gates of
these sweatshops for a chance to enter, since their current alternatives { inferior occupations, work conditions, or
unemployment { are much worse".
2Sen (1993) articulates workers' capability decit in the form of an inability to / a pessimistic attitude about the
prospects of breaking free from status quo: \Our desires and pleasure-taking abilities adjust to circumstances...those
who are persistently deprived... the routinely overworked sweatshop worker in exploitative conditions...tend to come
to terms with their deprivation."
2decits the working poor are not taken into account, for a full range of issues going from the ef-
ciency and equity implications of enhanced competition for labor, the rationale for social safety
nets in the face of open unemployment, to the interplay between trade and international labor
standards (OECD 1996, 2000, Brown, Deardor and Stern 1997).
In particular, we focus on a specic type of capability decit of employed sweatshop workers
{ their ability to search on the job while on the job. As a simple matter of time constraint,
excessive overtime alone can undermine the freedom of a worker to search on the job. Using
household survey data conducted in South Africa, Sch oer and Leibbrandt (2006) additionally
demonstrate the importance of physical health, as well as time constraint, as key determinants
of job search strategies.3
Thus, as an employment contract, we take a sweatshop job as one associated with: (i) a
higher disutility of work arising from poor work conditions and long hours, (ii) a corresponding
diminished ability to search on the job relative to workers engaged in decent work, and (iii) in the
presence of law enforcement a higher chance of exogenous break-up of employment relationship
relative to decent work subsequent to discovery.4 As a production function, we additionally
allow for the possibility of inecient sweatshops, in the sense that the disutility associated with
sweatshop conditions can outweigh output gains per worker, if any.5
We adopt as our workhorse the Burdett-Mortensen model of on-the-job search (Mortensen
1990, Burdett and Mortensen 1998), and do so for three reasons. It provides an ideal stochas-
tic and dynamic setting in which to study the issue of voluntary quits with on-the-job search.
Second, in both developed and developing countries, observed labor market search strategies con-
sistent with the implications of model have been found, where job search takes place both while
3Of course, reports of more extreme methods of retention also exist. For an international account, see Rivoli
(2005).
4These distinguish sweatshop labor as analyzed here from bonded labor arising from, for example, debt bondage
(Basu and Chau 2003, 2004), where workers are furthermore denied the ability to quit, and exploitative labor based
on deceit (Rogers and Swinnerton 2008) where workers are lured into employment without full information.
5Most models of search intensity endogenize the likelihood of receiving a job oer by introducing a cost of
job search, typically independent of the number of hours of work. See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for
an excellent survey. Benhabib and Bull (1983) is one exception where search intensity depends explicitly on the
number of hours of work forgone. Here, as well as in the larger literature on endogenous hours of work over the
course of the business cycle, workers are assumed to be freely able to choose. The key dierence between this
important class of models from the present setup is thus that the freedom to choose the number of hours of work
is undermined in sweatshops. The link between relative ineciency of sweatshops and work conditions including
excessive overtime is also absent in this earlier literature.
3unemployed, as well as on the job, depending on the wage and non-wage characteristics of the job
(Blau 1991, Banerjee and Bucci 1995). Furthermore, by incorporating a two sector rural-urban
framework with endogenous migration, we show that the full general equilibrium model predicts
employment, wages, and production outcomes in ways identical to the familiar Ricardian model
or the Ricardo-Viner model of international trade in the limit as entry cost tends to zero. Issues
concerning comparative advantage can thus be readily addressed, covering the full range of cases
from costly to free entry.
The augmented model of on-the-job search allows us to put a x on: voluntary worker par-
ticipation with full knowledge of the capability decit associated with sweatshop jobs; endogenous
employer choice of techniques, and the resulting dispersed distribution of sweatshop and decent
work contract values. A list of useful insights follow. The rst explains why the discounted value
of sweatshop earnings can fail to fully reect the Smithian compensating dierential even when
employment is strictly voluntary. In particular, we nd the capability decit to imply a single-
crossing condition, such that employers oering a suciently high valued contract (accounting for
pay, work conditions, and endogenous retention likelihoods) will never resort to imposing sweat-
shop conditions, for there is little need for them to preempt on the job search. Importantly, this
oers an endogenous labor demand side rationale for why sweatshop workers are always situated
at the utmost bottom rung of the equilibrium distribution of consummated job oers in overall
value terms { a suciently well paid job that adequately compensates for sweatshop conditions
relative to an average decent work is simply not in the equilibrium opportunities set. So long
as sweatshop jobs are no worse than outright unemployment, our model implies a relative equi-
librium ranking of the value of decent work, sweatshop jobs, and unemployment in ways fully
consistent with the stylized facts already discussed.
Our second set of results revisits the intrinsic merit of unregulated choice of technique. We
nd that inecient sweatshops that should otherwise be selected out of the market are in fact
made protable by workers' inability to freely seek self-betterment through on the job search. As
such, just because employers adopting inecient sweatshop technology and more ecient decent
work technology coexist, it does not follow that a ban on sweatshop will lower output, or exports
in equilibrium.6
6Equilibrium rm level heterogeneity is subject of longstanding interest in search models where frictions or entry
4These observations allow us to examine next a broad set of issues, including (i) the exis-
tence and comparative statics properties of sweatshop equilibria, (ii) the eciency and equity
implications of equilibrium sweatshop jobs, and (iii) the output and trade consequences of eorts
to enforce anti-sweatshop legislations. We nd embedded within the Burdett-Mortensen model a
sharp demarcation between two classes of economies, those that have graduated where sweatshops
are a non-issue, and those that have not. Graduation out of sweatshops even in the complete
absence of enforcement is possible, depending on technological parameters, entry costs, policies
that govern social safety nets for the unemployed, and global forces through the terms of trade.
Interestingly, we also nd that sweatshops have a tendency to beget even more sweatshops
in a rational expectation equilibrium. Our model illustrates the set of parameter values that
support multiple equilibria through a self-reinforcing mechanism. Here, the emergence of sweat-
shops provides the very justication for the equilibrium persistence of sweatshops, as workers
increasingly see sweatshop employment as the dominant form of employment available. The re-
sulting (rational) pessimism concerning the virtues of searching for decent work is then reected
in a downward adjustment in the endogenously determined reservation wage, further raising prof-
its. The important message here is thus that the impact of sweatshops reverberates throughout
the entire oer distribution adversely impacting decent work and sweatshop workers, while the
benets of the distributional shift go to sweatshop and decent work employers alike.
Furthermore, the two classes of economies { dierentiated either by whether graduation
criteria are met, or whether strict enforcement of sweatshop legislations is in play { exhibit
distinctly dierent behaviors when subject to market forces. First, enhanced competition in
sweatshop-free economies thanks to lower cost of entry tends to the \competitive" outcome in
the limit with universal marginal productivity pricing and zero prots. In contrast, unfettered
entry in the other class of economies without compensating changes in enforcement tends to
almost universal sweatshop employment instead, a persistent violation of marginal productivity
pricing, but nonetheless zero expected prots. Similar contrasts extend to policy impacts as well:
The provision of unemployment safety nets in a sweatshop-free economy unambiguously lowers
net manufacturing surplus by raising unemployment in the expected way, while the opposite may
costs confer rms with de facto monopsony power (Manning 2001). For expositions, see for example Mortensen
(2003) and Rogerson et. al (2005). In our model, capability decit is shown to aect choice of techniques even
when entry costs tend to zero.
5well be true in a sweatshop economy.
Turning now to whether there is in fact a tradeo between aggregate eciency and equity
in this second best world with inecient sweatshops, we demonstrate that the answer is nuanced,
and consequently, the policy choice is non-trivial. Indeed, sector-wide eciency as measured by
the net surplus (total value of output net of entry costs and disutility costs of work), distributional
bias as measured by the share of total surplus going to employed workers, as well as the quantity of
equilibrium unemployment are shown to rise when sweatshops are removed by strict enforcement.
These ndings highlight two distinct eects at work during the transition to decent work: a
negative quantity of employment eect, and simultaneously a composition of employment eect
that allows higher decent work surplus to be generated per worker.
Finally, in a full general equilibrium two-sector setting, relative rankings of urban unem-
ployment, intersectoral labor allocation, and output are provided. We distinguish between three
cases: (i) equilibrium coexistence of sweatshops and decent work in the urban sector of a two-
sector economy augmented with endogenous migration, (ii) the sweatshop-free Burdett-Mortensen
benchmark of the same economy thanks to strict enforcement, and nally (iii) the Ricardo-Viner
benchmark of once again the same economy with no sweatshops, thanks to strict enforcement
and cost free entry. The progression from one benchmark to the next highlights the two distinct
distortions in a sweatshop equilibrium: inecient choice of technique made protable by the
capability decit, and costly entry. Piecemeal correction of just one of these through strict en-
forcement of labor standards going from (i) to (ii) is shown to induce rural-urban migration, raise
urban unemployment, but the combined net outcome in terms of total output and thus exports is
ambiguous, depending on rural labor supply response to improvements in urban workers' welfare.
The next section describes the model. Sections 3 examines the issues of existence, cong-
uration, and comparative statics properties of a sweatshop equilibrium. Section 4 explores the
unemployment, eciency, distributional, and general equilibrium implications of lax enforcement
of sweatshop legislations. Section 5 concludes.
62 The Model
We begin with a partial equilibrium analysis of a manufacturing sector in a two sector economy,7
and scrutinize the equilibrium allocation of manufacturing job vacancies between sweatshop jobs
and decent work. Employment is determined via a model of on-the-job search in continuous
time. There are Nm workers and vm number of vacancies, both exogenously given for the time
being. The model features voluntary worker participation and quits from any job, expected
prot maximizing choice of technique between sweatshop jobs and decent work, and endogenous
determination of the distribution of income and contract values.
2.1 Worker Participation and Compensating Dierential
There are three states of employment (i): sweatshop jobs (s), decent work (d), and unemployment
(u). Each worker chooses a plan to maximize the lifetime expected value of the stochastic stream of
instantaneous utility, at rate of time preference r, E0
R 1
0 u(y(t);e(t))exp( rt)dt where E0 denotes
expectation at time 0. Instantaneous utility u(y(t);e(t)) = y(t)   e(t) depends on earnings y(t)
and the disutility of work e(t).
With earnings and work disutility both parts and parcels of employment, let W denote
the overall expected lifetime contract value of a job oer, and F(W) the cumulative probability
distribution of W on oer, with associated density f(W) where the derivative exists.8 The
relevant range of W on [0;1], as well as the share and rank of sweatshop job and decent work
oers along the contract value distribution will be determined endogenously in the model. For
now, the only assumption we adhere to is that workers' choices are made with full information
about F(W), including the type of employment, d or s, required by any job oer.
Relative to decent work, sweatshop jobs exact poorer work conditions and longer hours of
work. These dierences will be reected in the contract value of a job oer in three ways. First,
the disutility of sweatshop employment is the highest, with es > ed  0 = eu. At unemployment
income b  0, the instantaneous utility of an unemployed worker is u(b;0) = b  0.
Second, job search { a random draw from the distribution F(W) { takes place both on the
job in a decent workplace, and while unemployed. For these workers, the intensity of job oer
7The full general equilibrium two-sector model with rural urban migration and free entry is the subject of Section
5.
8We show in Section 3 that F(W) is continuously dierentiable in the relevant range.
7arrival is governed by a Poisson process with parameter u = d =   0.9 Sweatshop workers
by contrast can nd their capability to search on-the-job undermined, for excessive overtime and
sweatshop conditions can directly constrain a worker's time and physical resources to search on-
the-job. At its worst, s = 0. To recover the capability to search, a sweatshop worker must rst
quit and transition into unemployment.
A nal issue concerns law enforcement. We assume an exogenous job destruction rate
s = (1+)d = (1+) > 0.   0 characterizes the frequency of enforcement of labor laws that
breaks up sweatshop employment. In summary, unless otherwise compensated by way of higher
earnings, sweatshop jobs are undesirable from workers' perspective in all three regards.
The following Bellman equations can now be furnished, the solutions of which give the
steady state contract values Wi of each type of employment at earnings yi, i = s;d:
rWs = ys   es   (1 + )(Ws   Wu) (1)
rWd = yd   ed   (Wd   Wu) + 
Z 1
Wd
(W   Wd)dF(W) (2)
(1) and (2) carry the usual interpretation that the ow value of employment depends on instan-
taneous utility (yi   ei), the possibility of capital losses due to exogenous separations (Wi   Wu
at rate i), and capital gains and self-betterment feasible only in decent work through voluntary
separation following successful on-the-job search (W  Wd if W > Wd and zero otherwise at rate
).
The value of unemployment Wu solves:
rWu = b + 
Z 1
Wu
(W   Wu)dF(W): (3)
Since no worker will accept a job oer with contract value less than Wu, Wu is taken to be the
lower support of the range of job oers.
Translating (1) - (3) in terms of costs, the (instantaneous) minimal hiring cost required to
secure contract value W  Wu can be expressed as yi(W) = minfyijWi  Wg:
ys(W) = es + rW + (1 + )(W   Wu) (4)
yd(W) = ed + rW + (W   Wu)   
Z 1
W
(x   W)dF(x): (5)
9Alternatively, we have also examined the case with u > d > 0. This generates similar qualitative results,
but little new insights that are not already well known in the literature. These are available on request.
8Together these give the familiar steady state compensating dierential, ys(W)   yd(W),
with the only caveat that W is held constant. We do not know at this point of the analysis
whether sweatshop jobs and decent work span the same range of W. Equivalently, we do not
know whether there exists a sweatshop job that pays a wage high enough to fully compensate for
the conditions of sweatshops relative to decent work of comparable expected lifetime value W.
For now, however, it suces to note that the dierential is indeed strictly positive at given W,
as long as es > ed, (1 + )  1 and   0. In addition both ys(W) and yd(W) are monotone
increasing functions of W with dierential rates of increase,
@ys(W)
@W
= r + (1 + ) > 0;
@yd(W)
@W
= r +  + (1   F(W)) > 0:
With voluntary participation and quits, a job oer Wi is attractive enough for an unem-
ployed worker, and not so unattractive as to instigate quits, if and only if Wi  Wu, or equivalently
yi  yi(Wu) from the monotonicity of yi(W) in W, i = s;d.10 Thus, while the reservation con-
tract value of an unemployed worker is identical across jobs at Wu, the corresponding reservation
earnings (yi(Wu)) are job-specic:
ys(Wu) = es + b + 
Z 1
Wu
(x   Wu)dF(x) (6)
yd(Wu) = ed + b; (7)
where the two reservation earnings compensate for work disutility, forgone unemployment income
and the option to search where applicable.
2.2 Employer Participation and Single-Crossing
There is a large number (vm) of employers, each with one vacancy to oer. The same output can
be produced under sweatshop or decent work conditions, though the implied revenue (pi) and
wage cost (yi(W)) per worker dier. Denote pi = pqi as the average revenue of a worker in i. p
is an exogenously given relative price of the manufacturing output in this two-sector economy,
and qi denotes marginal product per worker in i, adjusted to account for any change in revenue
per worker associated with the provision of better work conditions, and the dierence in hours of
work between d and s. Instantaneous prot is pi yi(W) when output is positive and 0 otherwise.
A successful employer-worker match generates joint employer-worker instantaneous surplus
si amounting to pi  yi(W) plus yi(W) ei at opportunity cost b to workers, or, si  pi  ei  b.
10We show in what follows that there will be no equilibrium transition from decent work to sweatshop jobs.
9Henceforth, we maintain that both technologies are viable, si > 0, and in addition, decent work
is relatively more ecient in a static sense, so that the degree of static relative eciency11
 
pd   ed   b





The problem of an employer with rate of preference r, in choosing a plan to maximize the
discounted expectation of the stream of (stochastic) prots involves two decisions: (i) a contract
value W to post,12 and (ii) a technique (sweatshop or decent work) to adopt given the cost of
doing so yi(W).
We begin with (ii). For a contract oering W  Wu, the adoption of sweatshop conditions
implies a steady state value function Js(W), which solves rJs(W) = ps ys(W) (1+)Js(W):
Adoption of decent work condition by contrast yields ow value rJd(W) = pd yd(W) Jd(W) 
(1 F(W))Jd(W): These ow values depend on instantaneous prots, the possibility of capital




r + (1 + )
; Jd(W) =
pd   yd(W)
r +  + (1   F(W))
: (8)
(8) makes plain the set of tradeos employers face. From (4) - (5), sweatshop employers face
a positive compensating dierential (ys(W) > yd(W)) at constant W and a higher likelihood
of work stoppage due to law enforcement, . Decent work employers weigh these against an
augmented likelihood of voluntary separation (1   F(W)) induced by on-the-job search, short
of oering the highest contract value (at Wmax where F(Wmax) = 1).13
From (8), a single-crossing result obtains { the net prot gains from sweatshop as opposed





(r +  + (1   F(W)))2 < 0 (9)
11The equilibrium consequences of the case where  is less than one can be easily inferred from our setup as well.
Maintaining the relative eciency assumption throughout however allows us put focus on cases where sweatshops
arise despite its relative ineciency. Where useful insights apply, the results pertaining to the case of ecient
sweatshops  < 1 will be separately noted.
12W is a take it or leave it oer. This is consistent with sweatshop employment relations that do not accommodate
individual level / collective bargaining.
13The interested reader can readily verify that if s = , or in other words, if sweatshop conditions have no
impact at all on sweatshop workers' capability to search on the job, Jd(W) always outstrip Js(W), following the
steps explained below if and only if  > 1. Inecient sweatshops are thus always selected out in equilibrium without
the capability decit.
10whenever instantaneous prot (pd   yd(W)) is positive. Thus, a sweatshop job at a high enough
contract value W has little appeal for employers, since the likelihood of voluntary quits (1  
F(W)) from decent work diminishes with W in any case. We can now dene a unique endogenous
threshold
 W = maxfWjJs(W)   Jd(W)  0g
where job oers with low contract values W   W are sweatshop jobs. Employers oering higher
contract values by contrast choose decent work:
Proposition 1 If sweatshop and decent work coexist, an endogenous critical contract value  W =
maxfWjJs(W) Jd(W)  0g  Wu separates the two. Equilibrium sweatshop contract values are
never higher than that of decent work.
With the value rank of the two types of jobs as shown in Proposition 1, the relative shares
of the two types of job oers can be simply characterized. Denote   F(  W) as the fraction of
oers that exact sweatshop conditions, and 1    the fraction of decent work oers.
To briey sum up, the choice between sweatshop and decent work from a workers' per-
spective yield job-specic reservation earnings yi(Wu) consistent with the standard compensating
dierential view of worker compensation. Accounting for endogenous choice of technique from
employers' perspective amends this view, and sweatshop contracts are shown to be inferior to
decent work contract in overall value terms Wu   W  Wd. All these leave the existence of
the critical contract  W, the distribution F(W), and the associated share of sweatshop job oers
F(  W) =  to be ascertained. To this end, we depart from the problems of the individual worker
and employer, and proceed to discuss aggregate level steady state conditions.
2.3 Steady State Distributions and Match Success Odds
Pick at random any worker from the pool of job seekers to be matched with a job oer W. An
employer-worker match is consummated if W is no less than the worker's reservation contract
value: Wu for the unemployed, or for a worker searching on the job, the value of his existing
contract. The odds that an oer W nds a match should thus depend on the relative size of the
unemployment pool, and the distribution of existing realized contract values. But what dierence
will the prevalence of sweatshop jobs make? What about law enforcement that supposedly only
break up sweatshop contracts?
11Let ni, i = s;d;u be the fraction of workers in each of the three states of employment,
with ns +nd +nu = 1. Their steady state values solve the following systems of linear dierential
equations, requiring that inows into any state of employment equal outows. For any given
fraction of sweatshop oers  2 [0;1],
_ nd =  nd + (1   )(1   nd   ns) = 0
_ ns =  (1 + )ns + (1   nd   ns) = 0
nd and (1+)ns represent outows due to exogenous separation in d and s. In reverse direction
from unemployment to employment, overall job arrival  now consists of: (i) decent work arrival
(1   ), and (ii) sweatshop job arrival .14 Steady state outcomes are:
nd =
(1   )(1 + )
(1 + ) + (1 + (1   ))
; ns =





(1 + ) + (1 + (1   ))
: (11)
Setting  = 0, and  = 0, (11) is just the familiar steady state unemployment rate in models of
job search, with  and  aecting equilibrium unemployment share in the expected way. Beyond
these, (10) and (11) jointly highlight two important issues not previously addressed, showing
employment shares of two distinct types of work, s and d, and the addition of sweatshop arrival
() and law enforcement () as determinants of aggregate employment patterns.
By inspection, a rise in  raises steady state employment in sweatshops, and lowers partici-
pation in decent work. On net, if and only if law enforcement is positive, a rise in  exposes more
workers to a higher exogenous rate of separation, and results in higher steady state unemployment,
at constant .
(11) also shows important tradeos between labor standard enforcement and aggregate
employment. Holding  constant, an increase in law enforcement decreases the share of sweatshop
jobs, and increases the share of decent work, but the net eect is nonetheless an increase in total
unemployment from (11), as long as  > 0: This dilemma will be played out further in subsequent
sections, when the endogeneity of both  and  with respect to  is unveiled. For now, we state
14Note also that even with on-the-job search, no worker in a decent workplace will accept a job oer that
subjects him to sweatshop conditions, since  W strictly separates the two types of employment from Proposition 1.
Meanwhile, no sweatshop worker can transition into decent work without rst going through unemployment, for
s = 0.
12Proposition 2 All else equal, stricter enforcement is associated with a higher steady state rate of
unemployment if and only if  > 0. A higher fraction of sweatshop oers  is likewise associated
with higher steady state unemployment rate if and only if  > 0.
Let the steady state cumulative distribution of realized contract values be G(W) among
the Nm(1   nu) number of employed workers. With two dierent types of work separated by
the critical contract  W, consider to begin with any sweatshop contract W 2 [Wu;  W]. Balancing
outows of sweatshop contracts Nm(1 + )G(W)(1   nu), and inows of unemployed workers
NmF(W)nu, we have, using (10) and (11),
G(W) =
F(W)
1 + (1   )
for W   W; (12)
where the fraction of realized sweatshop contracts is increasing with the fraction of sweatshop
oers F(W), but inversely related to enforcement . At the margin, G(  W) = =(1 + (1   )).
Extending the range now to include both decent work and sweatshop contracts with W 
 W, note that contract termination arises because of (i) exogenous separation from sweatshop jobs
(Nm(1+)G(  W)(1 nu)), (ii) exogenous separation from decent work Nm((G(W) G(  W))(1 
nu)), and (iii) voluntary separation due to on-the-job search Nm((1 F(W))(G(W) G(  W))(1 
nu)). As before, unemployment to employment transitions constitute inows Nm(F(W)nu). In
a steady state, jobs destroyed are balanced by jobs created when
G(W) = G(  W) +
(1 + )
(1 + (1   ))
(F(W)   )
( + (1   F(W)))
for W >  W: (13)
The share of realized decent work contracts G(W)   G(  W) rises with enforcement , and de-
creases with the share of sweatshop jobs . Naturally, the best contract oer, Wmax, such that
F(Wmax) = 1, gives the best realized contract, for G(Wmax) = [+(1+)(1 )]=[(1+(1 ))] =
1:
The employment shares ni and the distribution of realized contracts G(W) in (10)-(13)
fully characterize the likelihood of a successful match between any given oer W  Wu and a
randomly selected job seeker. Let us denote this likelihood as h(W), the match success rate. For




Nm[nu + (1   nu)(1   G(  W))]
=

 + (1   )
  h(;) if W   W (14)
15This follows since no workers in decent work have contracts that yield less than  W from Proposition 1, and
since no sweatshop workers participate in on-the-job search.
13where Nm[nu + (1   nu)(1   G(  W))] is the sum total of workers receiving job oers, of which
Nmnu are unemployed and will therefore accept a sweatshop oer as long as W  Wu. Nm(1 
nu)(1   G(  W)) are workers in decent work receiving a new job oer thanks to on the job search.
Since these workers only accept job oers that are no worse than their decent work contracts,
direct voluntary employment transitions from decent work to sweatshop jobs are accordingly ruled
out (Proposition 1).
For decent work oers W   W, h(W) additionally accounts for job seekers already with
existing decent work contracts that are outmatched by W, (Nm(1   nu)(G(W)   G(  W))). The
revised match success likelihood is:
h(W) =
Nm[nu + (1   nu)(G(W)   G(  W))]
Nm[nu + (1   nu)(1   G(  W))]
=

 + (1   F(W))
if W >  W (15)
The match success rate h(W) is thus piecewise continuously dierentiable and weakly in-
creasing in W from (14) - (15). Given F(W), h(W) summarizes the workings of the labor market
equilibrium in a steady state (1) - (13). Intuitively, for a decent work contract, the odds of match
success diminishes with the rate of decent work arrival (1   F(W)), appropriately adjusted to
reect the share of decent work that outmatches W. For either sweatshop jobs, or the marginal
decent work oer, the corresponding match success odds  h(;) is likewise inversely related to
decent work arrival (1 ). But since any decent work outmatches sweatshop jobs (Proposition
1),  h(;) is locally independent of W, at =( + (1   )).
This inverse relationship between the match success odds of the marginal decent work oer
 h(;) and the decent work arrival rate (1   ) will play a key role in the sequel, and is shown
in Figure 1. Clearly, as decent work arrival tends to zero, the corresponding match success odds
approaches its maximum at  h = 1. With better job opportunities simply not available, it makes
little sense for any worker to refuse a marginal oer, in hopes of a better draw down the road.
By contrast, as decent work arrival approaches innity asymptotically, the match success odds of
a marginal oer  W tends to zero.
3 Sweatshop Equilibrium
Whether sweatshop jobs and decent work co-exist in a steady state equilibrium ultimately de-
pends on the expected prots of an employer with a vacancy. Thus let 	(N;vm) be a matching
technology representing the total number of matches (Pissarides 2000) between vm number of
14vacancies (inclusive of sweatshop jobs and decent work) and N job seekers N = Nm(nu + nd).
The total number of job seekers is thus endogenous, and include all but sweatshop workers for
whom s = 0. We assume that 	 is homothetic, monotonically increasing in both arguments,
with 	(0;vm) = 	(N;0) = 0.
The overall rate of (sweatshop plus decent work) job arrival for workers is  = 	(N;vm)=N =
	(1;vm=N) and the rate of an employer-worker match is e = 	(N;vm)=vm = 	(N=vm;1). Both
rates depend on the ratio of vacancies to job seekers vm=N. Accordingly denote  = 	(1;vm=N) 
 (vm=N) and e = 	(N=vm;1)   e(N=vm), where  (vm=N) and  e(N=vm) are monotone in-
creasing functions with  (0) =  e(0) = 0.
The expected prot of an employer with a new vacancy oering W is thus
(W) = eh(W) max
fi=s;dg
Ji(W);
which accounts for the likelihood of an employer-worker match (e), the likelihood that a contract
oer W will be successfully consummated given a match (h(W)), and the maximal expected value
of the contract given a successful match (maxfi=s;dg Ji(W)).
From Proposition 1 which solves maxfi=s;dg Ji(W), along with h(W) as expressed in (14)
and (15), and Ji(W) in (8), the expected prot function (W) can now be stated
s(W) =
e(ps   ys(W))
( + (1   ))(r + (1 + ))




( + (1   F(W)))(r +  + (1   F(W)))
otherwise: (17)
Dene a steady state sweatshop equilibrium as a threshold contract value  W, a contract
value distribution F(W), a corresponding share of sweatshop oers  = F(  W), and an
equilibrium job arrival rate  (and thus 
e) such that (i) all contract oers yield the same
expected prot  given (1) - (17), and (ii) expected prot maximizing employers freely enter or
exit subject to a per vacancy entry cost c:16
(W) = c: (18)
There are four sets of equalities that are of particular interest, the joint solutions of which give
the sweatshop equilibrium.
16In what follows, an asterisk denotes steady state equilibrium values.
153.1 The Equilibrium Threshold Sweatshop Contract
The rst requires that all sweatshop contracts yield the same expected prots for any W 2
[W
u;  W], or equivalently from (16),
ps   ys(W
u) = ps   ys(W) = ps   ys(  W):
Since the hiring cost ys(W) is strictly increasing in W from (4),
Proposition 3 In a sweatshop equilibrium, all sweatshop jobs, if they exist, identically oer the
same contract value equaling the equilibrium value of unemployment W
u. The threshold contract
 W coincides with the value of unemployment, and  measures a point mass of F(W) at W
u.
The intuition follows from (14) and (16). For a sweatshop employer, any attempt to raise
the contract value beyond the reservation level Wu increases hiring cost through ys(W), but leaves
unchanged the odds of a successful hire  h(;) = =( + (1   )). To maximize expected
prots, all sweatshop jobs oer just enough incentives for workers to agree to participate, and to
refrain from voluntary quits once on the job, but no more. Consequently, equilibrium sweatshop
oers  represents a mass of job oers at the lower support W
u =  W.
3.2 Equilibrium Distribution of Decent Work Contracts
A second set of equalities requires that all decent work oers (W >  W) yield the same expected
prot: d(  W) = d(W). From (17), a higher valued decent work oer is consummated with
a strictly higher probability h(W), but at a wage cost yd(W) that is likewise increasing in W.
Equilibrium expected prot equalization now implies a dispersed steady state distribution of
decent work contract value oers summarized by F(W) at and beyond the point mass W
u =  W.
Using (17), F(W) solves:
( + (1   F(W)))(r +  + (1   F(W)))





To gain even sharper insights, let us henceforth examine cases where there is no discounting
of the future, but where sweatshop workers nonetheless willingly accept doing without the option
to search, while sweatshop employers choose to put up with the possibility of law enforcement
16discovery. Even here, equilibrium F(W) can still be obtained with r ! 0:17











A; W  W
u: (20)
To complete the characterization of the distribution F(W), let W
max denote the equilibrium
upper support of the range of decent work contracts. With  = F(W
u) from Proposition 3, it




u f(W)dW = 1   F(W
u) = 1   ; or:
W
max = W
u + 2 h(;)(1    h(;))sd=: (21)
Evidently, the emergence of sweatshops impacts every worker in the economy, as  is in fact
subsumed in both the equilibrium range and oer distribution of decent work through its impact
on the match success odds  h(;).
We now come full circle, for the distribution of decent work oers is in turn a key determi-
nant of the protability of sweatshops through the reservation earnings term ys(W
u) in (6). Note
also that since the contract value of all sweatshop workers is pinned to the reservation level from
Proposition 3, ys(W
u) represents the instantaneous earnings of all sweatshop workers, and thus
Proposition 4 In a sweatshop equilibrium, the earning of any sweatshop worker diminishes with
the equilibrium share of sweatshop jobs , rises with the surplus of decent work sd = pd  ed  b,
and is independent of the surplus of sweatshop jobs ss = ps   es   b:
ys(W
u) = es + b +
 
1    h(;)
2 sd:
Proposition 4 illustrates two sets of intriguing ndings. To start, sweatshop workers in fact do
not directly partake in the fruits of sweatshop production as ys(Wu) is independent of ps, at
constant  and .18 The pay that they command depends entirely on the credibility of their




Wu (W   Wu)dF(W) =
 
1    h(;)
2 sd from (6), (20) and (21). A low decent work
surplus sd, among other things, is thus bad news for sweatshop workers in earnings terms.
In addition, it has been shown in (14) that the match success rate of the marginal decent
work oer  W (and thus sweatshop oer since  W = W
u from Proposition 3) rises as sweatshops
17From (20), the associated density is @F
(W)=@W = f




sd)  0 evaluated at
r = 0.
18This is in sharp contrast to workers in decent work, whose average earnings can be shown to be monotonically
increasing pd. We discuss this in greater detail in section 4.
17become more prevalent ( h(;) = =( + (1   ))). The associated impacts are two-fold.
First, a rise in  reverberates throughout the entire decent work oer distribution in (20), and
gives rise to a rst order stochastically dominating change, all else equal, as employers respond to
the relative ease of nding workers even with a marginal oer. Consequently, rising prevalence of
sweatshop jobs  is consistent with a pessimistic though nonetheless rational expectation about
the foreseeable gains from refusing a sweatshop job oer.
Second, the same rise in  also directly impact sweatshop earnings, as individual unem-
ployed workers act out this pessimism by demanding less sweatshop pay ys(Wu). These suggest
that the emergence of sweatshops has a tendency to beget even more sweatshops. Indeed, ex-
pected sweatshop prot s(Wu) is strictly increasing in  h(;), and thus  from (16) and
Proposition 4:
s(Wu) = e h(;)ss

1   (1    h(;))2)

=((1 + )): (22)
These wage cost savings spill over to benet decent work employers as well. For the marginal
decent work employer, such gains arise twice, once through a diminished likelihood of voluntary
work stoppage (1 ) instigated by successful on the job search in (8), and once more through
the likelihood of a successful match  h(;). In equilibrium, all decent work employers oering
W   W earn identical expected prot, and collectively benet from the emergence of sweatshops
through (7) and (17)
d(W) = e h(;)2sd=; W  W
u: (23)
(22) - (23) jointly present a set of two opposing forces on the relative protability of sweatshop
jobs versus decent work, as the incidence of sweatshop jobs rises. The balance between the two
will in the end determine the conguration of a sweatshop equilibrium.
3.3 Equilibrium Relative Protability of Sweatshop Jobs
An employer with a new vacancy prefers sweatshops over decent work, evaluated at the critical
contract  W = W
u, if and only if s(W
u)   d(W





+ (1   ) h(;)    h(;)2  0: (24)
19(24) follows immediately upon taking the dierence between (22) and (23) using the denition of  h(
;
).
18(24) reduces the problem of employers' choice of technique to a simple evaluation of the relative
magnitudes of three factors: the relative eciency of decent work over sweatshop as measured by
, the match success likelihood  h(;), and the intensity of law enforcement .
Two specic cases point to the main thrust of the inequality in (24). First, suppose that
the relative eciency of decent work is suciently pronounce, with   1. The sweatshop
equilibrium in this case is trivial, with  = 0. Our model thus readily reduces to the Burdett-
Mortensen model with the addition of work disutility ed. Second, as long as sweatshops are
relatively inecient ( > 1), (24) shows that sweatshops only equilibria cannot prevail even in
the complete absence of law enforcement.20
These said, what (24) importantly shows is that an equilibrium mix of inecient sweatshop
and decent work cannot be ruled out by the relative ineciency of sweatshops alone.21 From
(24), () rst increases, achieves a maximum at  h = (1   )=2, then decreases with  h as long
as enforcement is not too strict ( < 1).
These are illustrated in Figure 2, where () is plotted against the match success rate  h
with successively increasing levels of enforcement (0 > ). Where there is sti competition for
workers corresponding to a low match probability, Figure 2 shows that sweatshops are too expen-
sive to be protable for the hiring cost ys(Wu) is too high (Proposition 4), even though the need
to pre-empt workers from on the job search is also at its highest here. This wage cost disadvantage
of adopting sweatshop technologies narrows as sweatshops become prevalent, however, for ys(Wu)
falls with . Eectively, sweatshops reinforces the reasons for its own existence as unemployed
job seekers increasingly see sweatshops as the dominant form of employment available. But for
match success odds  h high enough and beyond the threshold (1   )=2, the need to preempt on
the job search is no longer as high a priority as new workers can readily be found. A further rise
in  h thus eventually favors employers adopting decent work, who nonetheless continue to benet
from rising incidence of sweatshops through better retention, and higher rates of match success
(23).




   < 0; (25)
evaluated at the endpoint  = 1.
21The case of ecient sweatshops ( < 1) thus constitute a special case in the other direction, where (;;0) =
(1   )= > 0 and (;;1) = (1   )=    > 0 if and only if  < (1   )=, and negative otherwise. It follows
that there are two possibilities. If and only if  is less than (1 )=, there is a unique equilibrium mix of sweatshop
and decent work. Otherwise, equilibrium is characterized by a complete specialization in sweatshop.
19Taken together, an equilibrium mix of inecient sweatshop and decent work is possible if
and only if (;;(1   )=2) > 0 evaluated at its maximum at  h = (1   )=2, or equivalently,
4(1   )= + (1   )2  R(;) > 0
a condition that is fullled whenever relative decent work eciency , and enforcement intensity
 are relatively small. At an interior equilibrium, the associated equilibrium match success odds
 h =  h(;) equalize the two expected prots, and are given by the roots of (;; h) = 0
from (24). To examine these solutions in greater detail, denote the roots of (;; h) = 0 as
 hmin and  hmax:
 hmin(;) 
1      R(;)1=2
2

1    + R(;)1=2
2
  hmax(;):
These roots are real if and only if R(;) > 0, and lie strictly between (0;1) if  > 1. We have
thus
Proposition 5 If  and  are suciently high, and thus R(;)  0, expected decent work prots
always outstrip sweatshop prots s(Wu)  d(Wu). If however R(;) > 0, expected sweatshop
prots are higher for intermediate values of  h 2 ( hmin(;);  hmax(;)), and lower for extreme
values, when either  h <  hmin(;), or when  h >  hmax(;):
In Figure 2, the equilibrium  hmin marks the minimal match likelihood required to kick-start a run
of relative sweatshop protability. The other expected prot equalizing match success likelihood
is at 1 >  hmax >  hmin where decent work is uniformly more protable thereafter.
3.4 Sweatshop Equilibria with Endogenous Entry
A nal equilibrium condition governing entry incentives closes the model, and determines the
equilibrium job arrival rate for workers , the odds of successful match for employers  h, and





e = c=(( h)2sd) =  e(N=v
m):
Equilibrium job arrival rate is thus:
 =   (v














20Since   and  e are monotonically increasing functions, it follows therefore that both the ease of
entry (1=c), the expected gains upon entering ( h)2sd, are positively associated with equilibrium
overall job arrival .
Figure 3 illustrates. The upward sloping OO schedule shows an overall job arrival schedule
 based on (26), and plots the overall entry response to varying levels of match success odds
 h. The downward sloping decent work arrival schedule (1   ) DD follows from our earlier
discussion, and is re-incorporated here to determine the sweatshop equilibrium. As has been
noted, DD summarizes the workings of the labor market from (1) - (13), which collectively imply
that the higher the rate of decent work arrival, the lower will be the match success odds of a
marginal decent work oer:  h(;) = =( + (1   )).
Clearly, when overall job arrival () coincides with decent work arrival ((1   )) at
( ho;o), sweatshops are a non-issue ( = 0).22 Henceforth, we will refer to this outcome as the
sweatshop free benchmark.
Now to the right, any match success odds  h higher than  ho may be sustained if overall job
arrival  is greater than decent work arrival (1   ). Or equivalently, if sweatshops prevail
( > 0). The vertical distance between the two schedules gives the equilibrium incidence of
sweatshop oers  consistent with free entry and labor market equilibrium (1) - (13).
Finally, match success odds to the left of  ho, at  h, say, can never be an equilibrium
outcome, for the incidence of sweatshops can never be strictly negative. Figure 4 combines (i) the
overall job arrival schedule O, (ii) the decent work arrival schedule DD, and (iii) the endogenous
choice of technique  in (24). Together, they show the existence and conguration of the
sweatshop equilibrium. The bottom panel furthermore illustrates a family of overall job arrival
schedules (O1;O2;O3) evaluated at successively lower costs of entry c.
There are two sets of cases of interest. The rst set is straightforward, and includes all
cases where  and  are suciently large, such that expected decent work prots always exceed
sweatshop prots (as with R(0;0) < 0 in Figure 4). The model reduces to the Burdett-Mortensen
world, where the sweatshop equilibrium coincides with the sweatshop-free benchmark ( ho;o).
Both  ho and o respond to exogenous shocks in the expected way: a rise in entry incentives sd=c
(going from O1 to O3) raises equilibrium job arrival o, to be followed by a corresponding decline
22From the denition of  h
(
;
), DD asymptotically approaches 1 as  h ! 0, and zero as  h ! 1. Since the
OO schedule is upward sloping, an intersection like  h
o is thus unique and always exist.
21in the odds of successful match  ho.
Now for R(;) > 0, endogenous choice of techniques in (24) requires that expected sweat-
shop and decent work prots are equalized at an interior equilibrium, respectively at match
success odds  hmin and  hmax. Together with the overall and decent work arrival schedules, three
distinct types of equilibrium outcomes are revealed, depending on the relative positioning of the
expected prot equalizing  hmin and  hmax, and the sweatshop-free benchmark level  ho. Since
 ho ultimately depends on entry incentives sd=c, let us dene two critical decent work surplus
to entry cost ratios, when overall job arrival ( h2sd=(c)) coincides with decent work arrival
(1   ) = (1    h)= h respectively at the two expected prot equalizing levels of match
success odds  hmin and  hmax:23
dmin(;)  fsd=cj ( h2
minsd=(c)) = (1    hmin)= hming;
dmax(;)  fsd=cj ( h2
maxsd=(c)) = (1    hmax)= hmaxg:
Since  hmin <  hmax, it follows that dmin > dmax. Consider therefore to begin with any sd=c < dmax
(O1 in Figure 4 where  ho
1 >  hmax). Here, the relative cost of entry is far too high, and consequently
equilibrium match success  ho
1 >  hmax is likewise high enough so that the pre-emption of on the
job search is not yet a priority. Expected sweatshop prots are thus strictly lower than expected
decent work prot as shown for any  h to the right of  ho
1. The sweatshop equilibrium here once
again coincides with the sweatshop-free  ho
1.
With incentives to enter in the intermediate range sd=c 2 [dmax;dmin] and thus  ho 2
[ hmin; hmax] (O2), sweatshops are now more attractive on two grounds: (i) match success odds
in the absence of sweatshops  ho
2 is low enough to render worker retention a priority, while (ii)
the relative cost of entry is likewise low enough to justify the adoption of inecient sweatshops.
There is thus a unique sweatshop equilibrium at the expected prot equalizing  hmax in Figure 4.
Compared to the sweatshop-free benchmark, the introduction of sweatshops implies a higher rate
of overall job arrival 
2 > o
2, but decent work arrival 
2(1   
2) is diminished relative to o
2.
Consequently, while the emergence of sweatshops does increase the number of jobs oers available
per job seeker through (
2 > o







Even more striking is the last set of cases where sd=c > dmin, where entry incentives are at
23This follows from the denition of match success odds  h = =( + (1   )), or (1   ) = (1    h)= h.
22their highest (O3). There are three possibilities. If sweatshops are absent to begin with, acute
competition for workers implies a very low match success likelihood  ho
3(<  hmin) and a corre-
spondingly high reservation sweatshop wage ys(W
u) (Proposition 4). This reinforces employers'
incentives to adopt decent work, and accordingly, expected sweatshop prot is strictly less than
decent work for any  h <  hmin as shown in the gure. The sweatshop free benchmark  ho
3 can thus
be sustained as one possible equilibrium outcome.
The other two equilibrium outcomes apply if sweatshops have already been in existence at
 hmin >  ho
3 and  hmax >  ho
3. Here, the reservation wage of the unemployed is made articially
low, and inecient sweatshops protable precisely because of the prevalence of sweatshops. The
corresponding sweatshop equilibria are respectively at  hmin and  hmax. In both cases, equilibrium
overall job arrival rates 
3;min and 
3;max exceed their sweatshop-free counterpart o
3, and the







3) decline as soon as sweatshops emerge. Between the two equilibria, we note that  hmin is
additionally unstable in the standard Marshallian sense, since expected net prot gains from
sweatshops is rising in  h and hence  in the neighborhood of  hmin. Henceforth, our comparative
statics analysis of interior sweatshop equilibrium will focus on  hmax. In summary:
Proposition 6 There are three possible sweatshop equilibrium congurations:
I. If R(;) < 0, or if sd=c is less than dmax(;), there exists a unique sweatshop equilibrium
at  = 0:
II. For R(;) > 0, and intermediate surplus to entry cost ratio sd=c 2 [dmax(;); dmin(;)],
there exists a unique sweatshop equilibrium, where

max = 1  
(1    hmax)
(( hmax)2sd=(c)) hmax
2 (0;1):
III. For R(;) > 0, and suciently high surplus to entry cost ratio sd=c > dmin(;), there




max = 1  
(1    hmax)
(( hmax)2sd=(c)) hmax
> 1  





Figure 5 plots in (sd=c;) space the parameter combinations that support the three distinct
sweatshop equilibria I - III in Proposition 6, when  is less than unity.24 A number of useful
observations follow. For easy reference, we list here the expressions for some of the key variables
of interest, evaluated at the equilibrium  h =  h(;). Respectively, these are the equilibrium
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yd(W)dG(W) + G(  W)ys(  W)
!
= Nmn
d[(1    h)pd +  h(ed + b)] + Nmn
s[es + b + (1    h)2sd]: (28)
4.1 Graduating out of Sweatshops
Figure 5 shows a sharp break between economies depending on the relative eciency parameter .
For economies with high 's (regime Ia with R(;) < 0 shaded in blue in the gure) sweatshops
are never a concern. The break occurs at ^  = 4=(4   (1   )2) > 1. In the complementary
range of economies ( 2 [1; ^ )), complications abound, with equilibrium outcomes ranging from
no sweatshops in Ib, to II where employers can knowingly open up sweatshops () even though
sweatshops are relatively inecient, and nally to III where there is a multiplicity of possible
sweatshop equilibria.
Now since relative eciency  = (pqd   ed   b)=(pqs   es   b) is governed by world price p,
productivity qi, eort cost ei and unemployment income b, there is an amalgam of possible routes
out of sweatshop equilibria, even in the complete absence of enforcement. It can be easily veried
24Regimes Ia and Ib in Figure 5 correspond respectively to the case of R(;) < 0, and the case of sd=c <
dmax(;) in Proposition 6. A fourth regime in the gure includes cases where  < 1 < 1=(1 + ), where as has




max = 1 is at one corner, while  h

min = 0 is at the other. The forgoing discussion can be straightforwardly
extended to incorporate comparisons between all sweatshop jobs (Regime IV) and all decent work (Regime I)
equilibria as well, by noting that the corresponding equilibrium overall job arrival rate can be simply read o of
Figure 5 using the overall job arrival schedule O evaluated at  h
 = 1 in an specialized equilibrium with sweatshop
jobs only.
25This follows from (5) and (10) - (13), upon a change a variable F
(W) = v with range v 2 [
;1] corresponding





24that economies with low unemployment income b, for example, are naturally more prone to be
trapped in the range of economies where the possibility of equilibrium sweatshops exists ( < ^ ).
Similarly, costly improvements in labor standards that lowers the disutility of decent work ed but
at the cost of a diminished decent work surplus pqd   ed   b overall has a similar eect. Finally,
an increase in world price p in the absence of a corresponding increase enforcement will also favor
the emergence and persistence of sweatshops if  > 1.
4.2 Enforcement and Unemployment Tradeos
A key question that besets the sweatshop debate is whether the emergence of sweatshop jobs (i)
create jobs for the unemployed otherwise not available, or (ii) exchange decent jobs for sweatshop
jobs with no net gains in total employment. To assess these questions, note rst of all from Figure
5 that as enforcement  rises, the range of  (  ^ ) that accommodates regimes Ib, II and III
is compressed, while the relevant zones for regimes II and III shift to the right.26 In the limit as
 ! 1, sweatshops are a non-issue in any economy where decent work is relatively ecient, as
^  ! 1 and the areas corresponding to regimes Ib, II and III vanish.
We can thus compare steady state employment rates nd, ns, as well as unemployment
rate nu in the two polar cases of (i) a sweatshop-free equilibrium due to strict enforcement
sweatshop legislations as  ! 1 and (ii) the corresponding interior sweatshop equilibrium with
no enforcement in regimes II and III. With (10) and (11), as well as help from Figure 3 where  h
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(1    h)
 h( + 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s:
The expressions for decent work employment no
d and n
d follow by denition of  h = =( +
(1   )). Strict enforcement of sweatshop legislations thus gives rise to (i) the replacement
of some sweatshop jobs by new decent work vacancies (n
d < no
d), but nonetheless (ii) a higher
unemployment rate overall as enforcement has a net deterrent eect on the entry of vacancies
( > o).27
26To see this, note that by denition dmin and dmax in Figure 5 intersect at sd=c = 4
 1((1+)=(1 ))=(1 
)
2. This intersection tends to 1 as  tends to 1.
27Unemployment impact of small changes in  at an interior equilibrium is likewise of interest. From Propositions
254.3 Enforcement and Eciency
With both a replacement of sweatshop jobs by decent work, and an overall increase in unemploy-
ment as entry is deterred, the impact of sweatshop legislations in eciency terms is uncertain a
priori. Thus, denote net manufacturing surplus at any instant as the sum of decent work and
sweatshop surplus net of the total cost of entry: Nm(n
dsd + n
sss)   v
mc. Total entry cost v
mc











Since the emergence of sweatshops unchecked by enforcement has been shown to raise the match
success rate of the marginal decent work oer from  ho to  h, the relative ease of match success
now encourages employers to incur entry cost vmc that would not have been spent if sweatshops
were banned. Making use of (10), (11) and (23), it can be readily veried that net manufacturing




mc = Nm(1    h)2sd (29)
where the equilibrium match success odds  h once again plays a critical role. Thus, measured
in terms of total manufacturing surplus net of the cost of entry, the combined eect of strict
enforcement on sector-wide eciency is in fact an unambiguous increase in net manufacturing
surplus.
This result { where more (net manufacturing surplus) can be achieved with less (total
manufacturing employment Nm(ns + nd)) { by enforcement of labor standards will be a real
surprise if sweatshop prevails in an otherwise rst-best world. But clearly this is not the case
here since entry cost is positive and  < 1, and in addition inecient sweatshop technology is
chosen in a sweatshop equilibrium because of the capability decit. We will return to the issue
of the implications of two distinct types of distortions in Section 4.7.
2 and 6, stricter enforcement puts into motion three distinct forces going in dierent directions: a rst eect which
exposes more workers to a higher exogenous separation rate, and a second eect which lowers the incidence of
sweatshops all else equal, and a third eect which lowers overall job arrival 
 as enforcement deters entry. Thus,
the relationship between unemployment and enforcement may well be non-monotonic, with some economies aspir-
ing to eliminate sweatshops through enforcement nding unemployment rising within some range of enforcement
intensities, and others just the polar opposite along the road.
264.4 Enforcement and Distribution
To assess the distributional consequences of equilibrium sweatshops between employers and
workers, let So denote the share of steady state workers' surplus net of opportunity cost b












= 1    ho
where no
d represents total decent work employment in the absence of sweatshops (no
d = o=(o+)
from (10)), and Go(W) follows from (27) evaluated at  = 0. Similarly, the share of net surplus
going to decent work and sweatshop workers in the absence of enforcement can be similarly
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Nmn
sss
= (1    h
max)2 < 1    h
max
The last inequality follows from (24) at an interior equilibrium  h
max. Comparing So, S
d and S
s
with the help of Figure 3, we have the following ranking
S
s < S
d < So < 1;
since  h
max >  ho whenever sweatshops prevail in equilibrium. Thus, sweatshop laborers receive the
smallest share of the (sweatshop) pie, but the emergence of sweatshops means that decent work
employees command a smaller share of total decent work surplus compared to the sweatshop-free
benchmark as well. Put another way, strict enforcement of anti-sweatshop legislations alters the
equilibrium distribution of surplus. Importantly, the distributional shift associated with a policy
ban on sweatshops actually goes against the interest of decent work employers.
In brief summary of what we have examined so far, strict enforcement of sweatshop legis-
lation raises sector-wide net manufacturing surplus (section 4.3), and shifts the distribution of
surplus in favor of continuing workers (section 4.4). The unavoidable cost of the policy, however,
is in the unemployment that it creates as the legislation discourages entry (section 4.2).
274.5 Dierential Responses to Competitive Forces
To further highlight the distinctive behaviors of economies with and without sweatshops, and thus
of economies with and without adequate enforcement of sweatshop legislation, let us now examine
the labor market responses to enhanced competition through ease of entry. Such an examination
is of importance as it revisits a longstanding question: can competition for labor alone can bring
forth ecient outcomes when at least some employed workers are subject to capability decits.
Starting from a sweatshop-free equilibrium (region Ia,b or region III at the rst one of the
three equilibria at  = 0 in Figure 5), it follows directly from (26) that as entry cost c tends
to zero, the OO schedule rotates backwards. Consequently, equilibrium job arrival limc!0 o
tends to innity, while equilibrium match success limc!0  ho = limc!0 =( + o) tends to 0.
Equilibrium prots limc!0 d(W) likewise tends to 0 evaluated at  = 0, since labor is priced
based on marginal productivity in the limit (yd(W) ! pd for all W  Wo
u from (28) as  ho ! 0).
As should be expected, cost free entry in the sweatshop free benchmark gives rise to (i) zero
expected prots, (ii) full employment (limc!0 no
u = =( + o) = 1), and (iii) universal marginal
productivity pricing of labor with So = 1 in the limit.
Starting instead from parameter values consistent with  > 0 (Regime II, or 
max in III)
with inecient sweatshops, lower entry cost increases the overall job arrival  in the usual way by
rotating the overall job arrival schedule anticlockwise. Thus, employers expected prots approach
zero as before, as the ratio of job seekers to employers Nm(n
d + n
u)=v
m, and hence 
e in (16)
and (17), declines with successive waves of new entry. In tandem, sector-wide unemployment
n
u = =( + ) also tends to zero.
But unlike the sweatshop free benchmark, a key dierence here concerns how new job op-
portunities are in the end divided between sweatshop jobs and decent work. From (24), it can be
clearly seen that once entry decision is made and the cost of entry (c) sunk, the equilibrium match
success rate ( hmax) that equalizes the expected prots of sweatshop jobs and decent work is inde-
pendent of c, all else equal. Equivalently, total decent work arrival (1 ) = (1  hmax)= hmax
is independent of c. Unfettered free entry of new job opportunities without compensating increases
in , or in law enforcement can thus only lead to a corresponding decrease in the share of decent
work oers (limc!0(1   ) = lim!1(1    hmax)=( hmax) = 0). In essence, any surge in job
oers  brought about by lower entry cost alone will entirely be of the sweatshop variety.28
28To see this, suppose instead that a small fraction of new employers elect decent work, and by so doing they
28Finally, in terms of the pricing of labor, note that since the equilibrium  hmax is invariant
to entry cost c, sweatshop workers' share of sweatshop surplus S
s also remains untouched at
(1    hmax)2, and the corresponding share for decent work S
d = 1    hmax are both strictly less
than one, and likewise invariant to c.
Two implications regarding the role of enhanced competition for labor in economies with
equilibrium sweatshops can now be singled out. First, competition for labor alone is not sucient
to steer employers incentives clear of choosing inecient sweatshop techniques for enhanced com-
petition for labor brought about only by ease of entry is shown to in fact heighten the incentive for
even more sweatshop jobs. Second, with lower cost of entry and rising prevalence of sweatshops,
expected prots for any new entry of employers is driven to zero in the limit due to the paucity
of workers that remain willing to hold out in search of opportunities other than sweatshop jobs,
rather than the need to pay each worker in strict accordance with their marginal product in the
sweatshop free benchmark to pre-empt voluntary quits with on the job search. Thus, competition
for labor alone is not sucient to correct for the biases in distribution S
s and S
d introduced by
equilibrium sweatshops, nor can it bring about marginal productivity pricing in this setting, as
individual employers continue to see little need to raise pay to retain workers.
4.6 Dierential Responses to Policy Change
Economies with and without adequate enforcement of sweatshop legislations can also be seen to
exhibit dierent responses to policy changes. Consider for example the role of unemployment
benets b. In a sweatshop free economy such as ( ho;o) in Figure 3, a small increase in b rotates
the overall job arrival curve clockwise for decent work surplus sd is strictly decreasing in b.
Equilibrium overall job arrival o accordingly falls, raising unemployment in familiar fashion no
u =
=(o+). Concurrently, net manufacturing surplus Nm(1  ho)2sd falls, as higher unemployment
benets raise the reservation wage, and deter entry.
In contrast, starting from a sweatshop equilibrium with  > 0 and no enforcement, the
same increase in unemployment benet rotates the overall job arrival curve as before. However,
raising unemployment income also discourages worker participation in sweatshops, and by so
collectively lower the match success odds of the marginal decent job oer ( h = =( + (1   ))) to the left of
 hmax in Figure 4. This intensies the need to retain workers, and raises the relative expected prots of sweatshop
jobs for  is strictly positive for  h <  hmax in the vicinity of  hmax. In equilibrium, it must be the case that total
decent work arrival 
(1   
) remains constant despite new entry.
29doing it steers employers away from the adoption of sweatshops since relative eciency of decent
work  = sd=ss rises with unemployment income b (Section 4.1). Graphically, this results in a
downward shift of the R(;) schedule, and a corresponding reduction in the equilibrium match
success odds  hmax. Thus, whereas overall job arrival declines, unemployment n
u = =( + )
rises, and decent work surplus sd = pd   ed   b decreases with b, net manufacturing surplus
(Nm(1    hmax)2sd) can nonetheless increase with enhanced social safety net, as the composition
of the work force shifts in favor of decent work.
4.7 General Equilibrium Implications
It is now a simple matter to extend the partial equilibrium setting of an urban manufacturing
sector with a xed number of workers Nm to a general equilibrium context. To see the key insights
that this addition yields, it suces to include one additional rural sector. Indeed, consider
the simplest case, where production and employment in the rural economy is governed by a
production function Yr = Yr(L   Nm), with diminishing marginal product Y 0
r(L   Nm)  0 and
Y 00
r (L   Nm) < 0. L denotes total manufacturing and rural population.
In addition, let rural employment be governed by marginal productivity pricing, with rural
wage yr determined by yr = Y 0
r(L   Nm) consistent with cost-free entry and the freedom to
search on the job for all rural workers within the rural sector. In a steady state, the ow value of
employment in the rural sector is thus simply:
rWr = Y 0
r(L   Nm):
Migration equilibrium requires that the ow values of rural employment and urban job search
are equalized, rWr = rWu, or from (3) and (6), Y 0
r(L   N
m) = b +  R W
max
W
u (W   W
u)dF(W).
Using Proposition 4, we have
Y 0
r(L   N
m) = b + (1    h)2sd; (30)
where (1    h)2sd =  R W
max
w
u (W   W
u)dF(W) is just the expected size of capital gains facing
the urban unemployed contingent on arrival of decent work oer. In the absence of sweatshops
30in manufacturing production ( h =  ho), the corresponding labor market equilibrium reads:29
Y 0
r(L   No
m) = b + (1    ho)2sd: (31)
Finally, if in addition there is cost-free entry in manufactures,  ho ! 0 from Section 4.5, and (31)
further reduces to the labor market equilibrium of the standard two-sector trade model of the
Ricardo-Viner variety, with intersectoral earnings dierential equaling exactly the disutility of




m) = b + sd = pd   ed (32)
where a superscript \c" denotes equilibrium values in the standard two-sector trade model aug-
mented with disutility of work ed > 0.
In the parlance of the theory of the second best, any deviations of the sweatshop equi-
librium with endogenous migration in (30) from the standard Ricardo-Viner world (32) can be
decomposed, in terms of two distinct sources of distortions: (i) insucient enforcement (where
applicable in Regimes II and III), which accounts for any dierence between (30) and (31), and
(ii) costly entry which distinguishes (31) from (32).
In this context, sweatshops can be seen as partially osetting the issue with lack of entry
in this second-best world by raising the share of surplus going to all employers including decent
work employers in the form of higher prots. However, it does so by creating its own distortion,
as migration is deterred, and total labor allocation in manufacturing falls below No
m, because
sweatshops bias the distribution of manufacturing surplus against workers. In particular, we





Thus, the lack of cost-free entry in manufacturing limits rural-urban migration, and the decline
in workers' earnings due to the incidence of sweatshops limits rural-urban migration even further.
29Alternatively, we can additionally allows for on-the-job search for manufacturing sector jobs from the agricul-
tural sector in a static general equilibrium model as in Fields (1989), by assuming a positive manufacturing job
arrival rate for a rural seeker of urban manufacturing jobs, though at a frequency strictly less than that of an urban
job seeker. This can be accomplished by augmenting the ow value of rural employment with capital gains that
arise from urban job arrivals. The qualitative results of what we state in the sequel remains unchanged.
30Of course, if there is in addition constant marginal product of labor in the rural sector, the standard two-sector
Ricardian model obtains.








where the emergence of sweatshops lowers both the rate of unemployment n
u and total unem-
ployment as well since N
m < No
m relative to the sweatshop-free benchmark, though universal
employment cannot be attained unless there is cost free entry (nc
u = 0) as shown in Section 4.5
as c tends to zero.
Finally, the juxtaposition of costly entry in manufacturing and insucient enforcement
has in general an ambiguous impact on total manufacturing employment, since the migration
eect (N
m < No





sweatshops. Nonetheless, it follows directly from (30) and (31) that if and only if the elasticity
of rural inverse labor demand schedule    dlog(Y 0
r(L Nm))=dlog(L Nm) is suciently low,









u = 0, and no
s = 0. Similarly, raising enforcement can have opposing impacts on manu-







Favoring an increase in manufacturing output, strict enforcement encourages rural-urban labor
migration, raising N
m. Favoring a decrease in manufacturing output, stricter enforcements de-
creases manufacturing employment rate (1   n
u). Finally, if in addition qs > qd, so that output
per work in sweatshop is indeed greater than decent work, a nal eect can further favor a de-
crease in manufacturing exports, as sweatshop employment n
s varies with  from (11), (26) and
Proposition 6. To pick out a clear cut possibility, if the rural sector of the economy resembles a
reserve army of laborers, characterized by a relatively low elasticity of inverse labor demand ,
the rst of these three eects dominate, and
Proposition 7 Starting from a sweatshop equilibrium with  > 0, strict enforcement of anti-
sweatshop legislations raises the size of the manufacturing workforce (N
m > No
m). Manufacturing




dqd) if the elasticity of the
inverse labor demand  is suciently low.
325 Conclusion
Sweatshop jobs embody a broad range of work conditions other than earnings, including hours,
health and safety standards, as well as representation. These conditions have been viewed as a
cost or a productivity enhancing item in employers' annual balance sheets; a plus or minus term
in a workers' instantaneous utility, and furthermore, as we have articulated in this paper, a set
of conditions that dictates an employed workers' capability to participate in the market process
of search. We nd that the archetypal on-the-job search model of the labor market, augmented
with all three of these features, generates a extensive list of new insights concerning labor markets
where sweatshop jobs, decent work, and unemployment co-exist.
At the level of individual workers and employers, it has been shown that (i) the value of
sweatshop jobs are pinned to the bottom of the equilibrium distribution of endogenously generated
contract values, and (ii) unregulated choice of techniques can generate inecient outcomes even in
this world with no scale economies, or learning and informational considerations. In the aggregate,
our analysis underscores the joint importance of social safety nets, technologies, ease of entry, as
well as domestic and global market forces in determining the prevalence of sweatshops even in
the complete absence of enforcement.
Interestingly, in the second best world of inecient sweatshops, eciency considerations as
measured by the size of the net manufacturing surplus, and equity considerations as measured by
the share of total manufacturing surplus going to employed workers, are shown to be not at all
in conict with one another. However, anti-sweatshop proposals will nonetheless present a set of
non-trivial tradeos for policy-makers, if unemployment eradication is high on the policy agenda.
The value-added of focusing on the capability decit of employed workers is furthermore
shown here through the distinctive implications that market forces and policies can have on the
two classes of labor markets, within the same Burdett-Mortensen model of on-the-job search.
Indeed, the capability decit sheds new light on the extent of trickle-down pricing from output
price to sweatshop wages, the role of entry in inducing ecient choice of technique, as well as the
eciency implications of social safety nets.
These suggest a number of directions for future research, incorporating consumer, producer,
and labor supply issues. To begin with, the eectiveness of \no-sweat" consumer activism clearly
depends on the extent of trickle-down pricing from output price to wages. Meanwhile, the impact
33of rm level heterogeneity due, for example, to foreign direct investment, is likewise of interest
particularly since we now have a framework that illuminates how decent work employers in fact
strictly benet from equilibrium prevalence of sweatshops. Finally, the impact of worker hetero-
geneity, due for example to international migration, is also relevant here since a generous welfare
state can nonetheless be home to workers vulnerable to sweatshop employment, as long as there
are workers, such as immigrant workers, who do not have access to social safety nets.
Reference
Bardhan, Pranab. 2005. Scarcity, Conicts, and Cooperation. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bardhan, Pranab. 2004. \The Impact of Globalization on the Poor." In S. Collins and C. Graham
(eds.) Brookings Trade Forum: 2004. pp. 271 - 296.
Banerjee, Biswajit and Gabriella A. Bucci. 1995. \On-the-Job Search in a Developing Country:
An Analysis Based on Indian Data on Migrants." Economic Development and Cultural
Change 43 (3): 565 - 583.
Basu, Arnab K. and Nancy H. Chau. 2004. \Exploitation of Child Labor and the Dynamics of
Debt Bondage." Journal of Economic Growth 9: 209-238.
Basu, Arnab K. and Nancy H. Chau. 2003. \Targeting Child Labor in Debt Bondage: Evidence,
Theory and Policy." World Bank Economic Review 17: 255-281.
Blau, David M. 1991. \Search for Non-wage Job Characteristics: A Test of the Reservation Wage
Hypothesis." Journal of Labor Economics 9 (2): 186 - 205.
Bourguignon, Fran cois. 2005. \Development Strategies for More and Better Jobs." Presentation
at the conference Help Wanted: More and Better Jobs in a Globalized Economy, organized
by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2005 { Washington, DC.
Brown, Drusilla K. 2000. \International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey of the Re-
cent Literature. Labour Market and Social PolicyOccasional Paper 43. Paris: Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Brown, Drusilla, Alan V. Deardro and Robert M. Stern. 1997. \Issues of Environmental and La-
bor Standards in the Global Trading System." Papers 97-10, Michigan - Center for Research
on Economic and Social Theory.
Burdett, Kenneth and Dale T. Mortensen. 1998. \Wage Dierentials, Employer Size and Unem-
34ployment." International Economic Review 39: 257 - 273.
Engerman, Stanley L. 2003. \The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Eco-
nomic Theory." In Kaushik Basu et. al (eds.) International Labor Standards. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing. pp. 105 - 181.
Fields, Gary S. 1989. \On-The-Job Search in a Labor Market Model." Journal of Development
Economics 30: 159 - 178.
Manning, Alan. 2001. Monopsony in Motion. Princeton University Press.
Mortensen, Dale. T. 1990. \Equilibrium Wage Distributions: A Synthesis." In J. Hartog, G.
Ridder and J. Theeuwes, Eds., Panel Data and Labor Market Studies. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Mortensen, Dale T. 2003. Wage Dispersion: Why are Similar Workers Paid Dierently? Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1996. Trade, Employment,
and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers Rights and International Trade. Paris:
OECD.
||. 2000. International Trade and Core Labour Standards. Paris: OECD.
Piore, Michael (2004), Rethinking International Labour Standards, In: Labour and the Global-
ization of Production: Causes and Consequences of Industrial Upgrading (W. Milberg, ed.)
Baskingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 249-265.
Pissarides, C. A. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Powell, Benjamin and David Skarbek. 2006. \Sweatshops and Third World Living Standards:
Are the Jobs Worth the Sweat?" Journal of Labor Research 27 (2): 263 - 274.
Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright, 2005. "Search-Theoretic Models of the
Labor Market: A Survey." Journal of Economic Literature 43 (4): 959-988.
Rivoli, Pietra. 2005. The Travels of a T-shirt in the Global Economy. New Jersey: John Wiley
& Sons.
Robinson, Joan. 1964. Economic Philosophy. Garden City NY: Doubleday.
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. \Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We
Do About Them. in Robert Z. Lawrence, Dani Rodrik and John Whalley (eds.), Emerging
Agenda For Global Trade: High States for Developing Countries. Washington Overseas
35Development Council Essay No. 20, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 35-79.
Rogers, Carol Ann and Kenneth A. Swinnerton. 2008. \A Theory of Exploitative Child Labor."
Oxford Economic Papers 60 (1): 20 - 41.
Rosen, Sherwin. 1986. \The Theory of Equalizing Dierences." In Orley Ashenfelter and Richard
Layard (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics vol. I. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Sch oer Volker and Murray Leibbrandt. 2006. \Determinants of Job Search Strategies: Evidence
from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey." South African Journal of Economics 74 (4):
702 724.
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London:
Methuen and Co., Ltd. Fifth edition.
Sen, Amartya. 1993. \Capability and Well-Being." In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen
(eds.), The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 3053.
Singh, Nirvikar. 2003. \The History and Political Economy of International Labor Standards." In
Kaushik Basu et. al (eds.) International Labor Standards. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
pp. 9 - 83.
US General Accounting Oce. 1988. \ `Sweatshops' in the U.S. Opinions on their Extent and
Possible Enforcement Options." GAP/HRD-88-130BR.
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. 2004. A Fair Globalization: Cre-
ating Opportunities for All. Geneva: ILO Publications.
36Figure 2









R(ρ, λ) > 0
R(ρ, λ’) < 0
Figure 1





) 1 ( σ α −Figure 3
Overall Job Arrival and Decent Work Arrival 
Schedules
































min h max h
O1
R(ρ, λ) > 0


















































sd/c = dmin sd/c = dmax